ABSTRACT
Much has been written about this financial crisis. Starting with the housing boom, rising home prices and subprime mortgages, the stage was set for a series of disastrous events that would create volatility in stock markets seldom experienced. The Fed and the U.S. Treasury Department actively pursued policies to stabilize financial markets. In particular, the U.S. Treasury department initiated TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, to inject capital into banks with troubled assets. The Fed provided loans to JPMorgan Chase to help in the buyout of Bear Stearns and to Bank of America to acquire Merrill Lynch. The Fed also provided loans to AIG (American International Group) and the U.S. government received an equity stake in the company (Karnitschnig, Solomon , Pleven, and Hilsenrath, 2008, p. 1).
The purpose of this paper is to determine if Fed and Treasury policies have in fact, stabilized financial markets during the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] . The results will shed light on the usefulness of further intervention given forecasts of a prolonged and deep recession. The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section, an overview of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 will be presented. The traditional stock valuation model will be presented, followed by a methodology and data section. Finally, the empirical results and conclusions will be summarized.
92

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-2008
In 1999, the S&P 500 Index increased by 19.53%. It would fall over the next 3 years by 10.14% in 2000, 13 .04% in 2001, and 23.37% in 2002. The U.S. economy officially entered a recession starting in March 2001. The Fed reduced interest rates to stimulate the economy and by the summer of 2003, the Federal funds rate was at a record low according to Zandi (2000, p. 9) . Mortgage rates also fell from 7% in 2001 to 5.23% by 2003 (Waggoner (2008, p. 63) ) and "By the end of 2003, home prices had gained 8% nationwide, their best showing since 1953," (Waggoner, (2008, p. 22) . With rising home prices, a purchase of a home became a good investment. Mortgage companies were even making loans to those with bad credit histories and low incomes. These subprime mortgages where often referred to as "liar loans" since the borrowers were not required to provide proof of the amount of income they were earning. Furthermore, many of these subprime mortgages were adjustable rate mortgages which came with a low "teaser" rate which would increase in a few years. The borrowers were often told by the mortgage companies that with the increase in the value of their home they could either sell the home and pay back the mortgage or refinance their mortgage at a lower rate. According to Brownell (2008, p. 51) , "Thirty years ago subprime borrowers were basically out of luck. They couldn't get a loan. The government felt that subprime borrowers were being discriminated against. In reality the banks didn't want to loan them money because they were high risk and many of them wouldn't be able to repay the loans." The government insisted that financial institutions make loans to subprime borrowers and thus financial institutions found a way to make subprime mortgages profitable by selling them.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and investment banks were purchasers of mortgages. Holmes (1999, p. 1) stated, "In a move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and low-income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit requirements on loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders...Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits." After the mortgages were bought by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Wall Street firms, they were pooled together or packaged and used as collateral to create bonds called "mortgage backed securities" (MBSs) that paid interest to investors. These MBSs were sold to institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, banks, cities, states, universities, endowment funds, and other investors (Brownell, 2008, p. 45) . Zandi (2008) stated that with the U.S. trade deficit and with U.S. dollars going overseas to China, Russia, and the Middle East, many of these dollars were returning back to the U.S. to purchase Treasury bonds and MBSs.
In the period of rising home prices, 2000 to 2006, new homes were constantly being built and purchased by first time home owners and investors. Zandi (2008, p.15) stated, "House sales, construction, and prices were all shattering records. Prices more than doubled in such far-flung places as Providence, Rhode Island; Naples, Florida; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Tucson, Arizona; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Sacramento, California." Zandi (2008, p. 16) further stated "...by mid 2004, the booming housing market and strong economy convinced policy makers it was time to throttle back by raising interest rates." According to Waggoner (2008, p . 63) mortgage rates went from 5.23% in 2003 to 5.7% in 2005. By 2006, they were 6.41%. These higher mortgage rates combined with high home prices new home buyers were facing, signaled the end of the housing boom. With the surplus of new homes that had been built and with the decline in home purchases caused by high mortgage rates and high home prices that potential buyers could not afford, home prices began to fall. Waggoner (2008, p. 61) stated, "The median price of a single-family home (half were higher, half were lower), hit $230,900 in the third quarter of 2006 (National Association of Realtors). By November, the median price had slipped to $216,700 and by the end of February 2008, $195,600." Many homeowners were "underwater" with the value of their home less than their outstanding mortgage. Individuals who had taken out subprime mortgages with adjustable mortgage rates saw their mortgage rates and payments increasing and could not sell their home at a profit and could not refinance at a lower rate. The mortgages that had been created and sold and resold were no longer generating the revenue that was once expected. Interest payments and principal to investors of MBSs were now in jeopardy. As a result, the value of MBSs fell. Insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, banks, foreign companies, and other investors in MBSs were now suffering losses. The investment banks who had purchased subprime mortgages were incurring losses. According to Waggoner (2008, p. 76) , "In October (2007) Citigroup, the nation's largest bank, wrote down $2.2 billion of subprime loans from its books." (Citigroup was one of the most active participants in the sub-prime mortgage-backed securities market). In November, Merrill Lynch stunned the financial community with a $7.9 billion write down... In December, Bear Stearns was forced to write down $1.5 billion in assets, and announced its first-ever quarterly loss." Zandi (2008, p. 6) further stated, "Bear Stearns bet big on the residential mortgage market. It not only issued mortgage securities, it had acquired mortgage lending firms that originated the loans that went into those securities." Bear Stearns also had hedge funds that invested in MBSs.
The Fed was concerned that the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns would destabilize financial markets. According to Waggoner (2008, The TARP operates as a "revolving purchase facility." The Treasury has a set spending limit, $250 billion at the start of the program, with which it purchased assets, and then either will sell them or hold the assets and collect the "coupons". The money received from sales and coupons is supposed to go back into the pool, facilitating the purchase of more assets. The initial $250 billion can be increased to $350 billion upon the president's certification to Congress that such an increase is necessary. The remaining $350 billion may be released to the Treasury upon a written report to Congress from the Treasury with details of its plan for the money. Congress then has 15 days to vote to disapprove the increase before the money will be automatically released. . These asset-backed securities were to be backed up by auto loans, student loans, credit card loans, or smallbusiness loans. The purpose of these loans was to encourage the purchase of these asset-backed securities and inject capital and liquidity into the financial system to increase lending to consumers and businesses. Morrison .25) ) stated, "Since October, the government has deposited $165 billion into the accounts of the nation's eight largest banks. Yet those same financial firms are now worth $418 billion less than they were four months ago. And the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the government's preferred shares are worth at least $20 billion less." Gandel (p. 28) further stated, "TARP does nothing to patch the hole in the banking system. And it certainly doesn't do anything to encourage banks to make more loans. Yes, banks have gotten nearly $300 billion in money from the government, and that's a lot of dough. But it's not free dough. In return for federal cash, the government has taken preferred stock shares as the firm's markers. Unlike common stock, which is the kind you or I would buy from a broker, preferreds have to eventually be paid back, so these are really loans, not additional capital." Time Magazine (Feb. 23, 2009 ) stated the following about TARP and former Treasury Secretary Paulson. "Paulson was too late in battling the crisis, and letting Lehman fail was a pivotal mistake that rapidly eroded confidence. His attempt to fix the problem--a bailout that netted $700 billion from Congress--has been a wasteful mess." Barr (2008, p. 1) stated: "It may be years before we can judge the government's success in fighting the financial crisis...While the Treasury secretary has said repeatedly that one of his aims in deploying his $350 billion war chest is to restore confidence in markets and financial institutions, a look at depressed stock prices and stressedout bond markets says he has yet to succeed." The stock market has shown many swings since the TARP Capital Purchase Program (TARP I) was announced on October 14 Have TARP and Fed policies stabilized financial markets? The purpose of this paper is to see if volatility in stock index returns has or has not been reduced due to the stabilization policies implemented.
In the next section, the traditional stock valuation model will be presented. It will outline the conditions under which Fed and Treasury policies may increase or decrease volatility in stock index returns.
THE TRADITIONAL STOCK VALUATION MODEL
Following the dividend-cash-flow model, a stock's price is the present value of expected future cash flows as given below.
In equation (1), P t is the stock's price in period t, D t+k ,is the dividend in period t+k, E is the expected value operator, E(D t+k ), is the expected dividend in period t+k, T is the time period in which the stock is sold, P T , is the price the stock is sold for in period T, and r is the discount rate. Dividends per share in period t+k are a function of profits in period t+k of the company issuing the stock, and are modeled as follows.
where  t+k is profits in period t+k and f  is assumed to be positive. Finally, expected dividends in period t+k are 
From equation (3), any factor affecting expected future profits of a company will affect expected future dividends and the stock's current price. On the revenue side, if investors anticipate higher consumer incomes and higher company sales in the future, expected future profits will be higher than otherwise anticipated and stock prices should increase. On the cost side, if investors anticipate credit restrictions in the future placed on companies by banks facing losses, then expected future profits will be less than otherwise anticipated and stock prices will fall. Since stock returns are percentage changes in stock prices, those same factors affecting stock prices will affect stock returns.
The Treasury Department and Federal Reserve have taken steps to inject capital into the nation's banking system. Loans have been made by the Fed to financial companies acquiring banks in distress. Preferred shares have been purchased in banks by the U.S. Treasury Department to increase bank lending. These policies should affect stock prices and returns in several ways. First, the cost of acquiring funds has been reduced to those financial companies receiving TARP funds and Fed loans. This should raise their expected profits and stock prices giving rise to positive stock returns or negative returns that are not as large as they would otherwise have been. Second, bank lending should be increased with the increase in capital to banks. This added source of funds to businesses should increase their expected profitability, share price, and stock returns. Third, these Fed and Treasury policies should affect the expectations of consumers and investors. If it is felt that positive steps are being taken to improve the nation's financial system and economic well-being, then consumer confidence along with consumer expenditures on goods and services should increase and more investors should return to equity markets. The net result should be a reduction in consumer and investor uncertainty about the future and a stabilization of stock returns (as measured by a decrease in volatility of stock index returns) following the implementation of Fed and Treasury policies. On the other hand, as the critics point out, bank lending may not increase with Fed and Treasury policies and banks may simply use the additional capital for large bonuses paid to their executives or they may simply hold on to the additional capital if there are no borrowers. Furthermore, if consumers do not expect these policies to work and improve the economic situation, then consumer confidence and spending will not increase and there will be no reduction in the volatility of stock returns.
In the next section, the data and methodology used to test the success or failure of these stabilization policies will be presented.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In the traditional stock valuation model of section 3, stock prices, changes in stock prices and stock returns, depend on expectations of investors of future company profits. These profits are in turn, a function of Fed and Treasury policies. Since Fed and Treasury policies occur at given points in time, they are modeled as binary independent variables: 1 on the relevant date(s) over which the policy was in effect and 0 otherwise. To estimate this stock valuation model for the overall economy, stock index returns rather than individual company returns are used as the dependent variable while binary independent variables are retained to account for Fed and Treasury policies. Stock index returns for the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), the NASDAQ and the S&P 500 from January 5, 1999 to January 9, 2009 are shown in figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. These daily returns (r t ) were calculated from daily index figures (I t ) using the formula, In figures 1 through 3, the amplitudes of returns vary over time with periods of high volatility followed by periods of low volatility of returns. This volatility clustering or persistence is frequently found in financial timeseries variables. Thus the stock valuation model involving stock index returns and binary independent variables, must account for such volatility clustering. This is accomplished through use of the ARCH and GARCH models. The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 97 Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models were developed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) , respectively. These models have been used in the literature to determine the effects of social, economic, and political events, on the volatility of stock index returns. Examples of papers using these models include Fabozzi In the next section, the estimates of the GARCH model will be presented and discussed.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The maximum likelihood estimates of the GARCH model are given in Table 1 for stock index returns from the DJIA, the NASDAQ and the S&P 500.
3 The sample period from January 5, 1999 to January 9, 2009 contained 2,519 observations for each of the three separate models that were estimated.
In the DJIA model,   , the sum of the coefficients of was again close to one indicating the high persistence of shocks to volatility of index returns. 6 The coefficient of D1 in the variance equation was positive and significant (+1.72) indicating an increase in index return volatility in the post-September 15, 2008 period. The coefficient of D2 was negative and significant (-2.0888) indicating a more than offsetting decrease in return volatility with the implementation of TARP 1 and Fed policies after October 14, 2008 . These results support the arguments made by those who believed that such policies stabilized financial markets. 7 In the S&P 500 model, results similar to those for the DJIA and NASDAQ were obtained. The stock index return series exhibited high persistence in volatility and again the coefficients of D1 and D2 were significantly positive and negative, respectively, showing the contribution of Fed and TARP 1 policies towards stabilization in financial markets. 
4).
To determine if TARP 1 did indeed stabilize financial markets, the traditional stock-valuation model in return form was estimated for the overall economy using stock index returns from the DJIA, the NASDAQ and the S&P 500. Changes in Fed and Treasury policies that affect expectations of future company profits and current stock prices and returns, were modeled as dummy variables. Furthermore, since volatility in stock index returns is highly persistent, the GARCH model was used. It was found that (1) There is also some evidence that the positions of some financial institutions have improved to the point where they can start to pay back TARP funds to the government. A Reuters report (2009, June 8, p. 1) stated: "Some of the banks expected to get the green light to pay back TARP money include JPMorgan, American Express co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corp and U.S. Bancorp, the New York Post said on Monday...Later this week the government is expected to disclose which of the 19 largest U.S. banks will be allowed to repay some or all of their TARP money."
The Fed and Treasury have indeed been involved with many policies to stimulate the economy, create jobs and make loans available for consumers and businesses. Some of these policies included TARP 1, TARP 2, TALF, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, stress tests for financial institutions to see if they could sustain losses from a worsening economy, and the Public-Private Investment Program, part of which involves an expansion of TALF (the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility). The combination of these policies may be what is needed to bring the financial crisis to an end.
NOTES
1.
The exact specification of the "mean equation" depends upon the autoregressive structure of the index return series. This will be determined in section 5, "empirical results".
2.
For the unconditional variance to exist, this condition must be satisfied. See Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, p. 589 ).
3.
In estimating the GARCH model, the likelihood function that is maximized is: 
4.
To test if the mean equation was correctly specified (the DJIA index return series was specified using a first-order autoregressive process), the correlogram of standardized residuals was analyzed. All of the Qstatistics were insignificant, indicating a correctly specified mean equation. To test if the variance equation was correctly specified the correlogram of squared standardized residuals was examined. All of the Qstatistics were insignificant at the 5% level indicating a correctly specified variance equation.
5.
The GARCH model was also estimated when the dummy variable, D2, was 1 for the dates from October 28, 2008 to January 9, 2009, and 0 otherwise. October 28 was the date when the first TARP 1 purchases took place which was 14 days after the announcement date. The results of the GARCH model were very similar to those using the announcement date.
6.
To test if the mean equation for the NASDAQ model was correctly specified, the correlogram of standardized residuals was analyzed. All of the Q-statistics were insignificant, indicating a correctly specified mean equation.
7.
To test if the variance equation for the NASDAQ model was correctly specified, the correlogram of the squared standardized residuals was examined. Some of the Q-statistics were significant, indicating remaining ARCH in the variance equation. Thus the variance equation for the NASDAQ model was reestimated using two ARCH effects and one GARCH effect. The results are given below: The coefficient of D1 is still positive and significant and the coefficient of D2 is still negative and significant which reinforces the results in Table 1 . The correlogram of squared standardized residuals for this model were then analyzed. The Q-statistics were all insignificant indicating a correctly specified variance equation.
8.
To test if the mean equation for the S&P 500 model was correctly specified, the correlogram of standardized residuals was examined. All of the Q-statistics were insignificant indicating a correctly specified mean equation. To test if the variance equation was correctly specified, the correlogram of squared standardized residuals was examined. All of the Q-statistics were insignificant at the 5% level, indicating a correctly specified variance equation. 
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